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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Relative Use of Form 8-K Disclosures:  
 
A Trading Response Analysis. (August 2003) 
 
Andrew John McLelland, B.S., Florida Atlantic University; 
 
M.B.A., Florida State University 
 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:  Dr. William M. Cready 
          Dr. Martha L. Loudder 
 
 
 
Prior research suggests that the use of accounting information differs 
substantially by investor class. My analysis extends this line of research to the area of 
SEC Form 8-K filings. Prior research also provides mixed evidence on the 
informativeness of these filings. I hypothesize that the method of the disclosure is an 
important factor in evaluating 8-K usefulness to varying types of investors. Specifically, 
the timing, venue, and packaging of these accounting disclosures affect their use by 
investors.  SEC Regulation Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading (2000) considers 
both press releases and 8-K filings as broad-based disclosures that do not favor any 
investor class. I, however, identify five unique informational settings in which 8-K 
filings occur.  The five settings are: a concurrent 8-K event and filing (with or without a 
press release), a filing which precedes the press release, a press release that precedes the 
filing, an 8-K event that precedes a filing and/or press release, and the 8-K event alone.  
I examine the similarities and differences in trading by small and large investors across 
these settings. The identification of these empirical regularities with respect to disclosure 
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form should be particularly useful to policy makers seeking to implement level playing 
field objectives with respect to public disclosures. My findings show that the relative 
trading activity to 8-K filings is different by the type of disclosure.  Differential trading 
activity was found to be more pronounced in disclosure settings that contained a public 
announcement.  In addition, the type of Form 8-K disclosure also had an effect on the 
differential trading activity.  Form 8-K filings of acquisition or disposition of assets were 
associated with the most pronounced responses.   My findings show the differential 
trading activity to these filings differs from other accounting events such as earnings 
announcements and annual report filings.      
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This study investigates the trading behavior of large and small investors around 
8-K disclosures.  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that a Form 
8-K be filed for certain events not previously disclosed (e.g., acquisition or disposition 
of assets, changes in certifying accountant, change in fiscal year, etc.).1  Studies in the 
accounting literature often examine whether accounting disclosures provide investors 
with useful information to make trading decisions.2  This study asks a different, but 
related, question: what is the relative composition of investors using 8-K disclosures as a 
function of how and when they are disclosed?   
Form 8-K disclosures provide timely information to investors making valuation 
decisions between the filings of more detailed quarterly reports (Form 10-Qs).  For 
example, in 1999 over 30,000 Form 8-K’s were filed using the Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system.  Based on the timing and 
magnitude of this information release, 8-K disclosures should be a significant and 
valuable source of information for investors.  Knowledge of the differential use of 8-K 
disclosures is important for at least two reasons.  First, Lev (1988) argues that the 
usefulness of accounting information differs across various classes of investors.    
                                                 
 This dissertation follows the style of Accounting Review. 
1 Securities Act of 1934, Sections 13 and 15(d).   
2 Carter and Soo (1999) find significant price and volume reactions to 8-K filings. 
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If investors’ uses of 8-K disclosures differ by the type of investor, then my study 
may be important to policy makers and regulators interested in examining if a level 
playing field exists for all investors.  According to the SEC, investor protection was 
Chairman Levitt's top priority. 3   The SEC Regulation Selective Disclosure and Insider 
Trading (2000) considers either press releases or 8-K filings as broad-based disclosures, 
which do not favor either investor class.  This study is the first to investigate the 
difference between investor groups’ responses to Form 8-K disclosures.  Second, it is not 
known if previous research examining a heterogeneous response to accounting 
information is generalizable to 8-K disclosures.  A differential trading activity has been 
documented for both earnings announcements (Cready 1988, Lee 1992, Radhakrishna 
1998, and Bhattacharya 2001), and annual reports (Cready and Mynatt 1991).  Form 8-K 
disclosures are different from these types of accounting information (the events are 
randomly spread throughout the year), and their importance to various classes of 
investors is unexplained.  This study will provide further evidence on the differential use 
of accounting information by investor type.   
The SEC and other regulators set standards so as to create a level playing field 
across all public companies and users of financial information.   
                                                 
3 SEC Biography: Chairman Arthur Levitt, January 2001. 
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The level playing field theory assumes that all investors are equally rational in 
how they process information; however, two different types of investors are assumed: 
sophisticated and unsophisticated.4  Regulators set standards designed to optimally 
“package” the mandated information in order to achieve equality of access and 
opportunity, that is, “fair disclosure” (Beatty and Hand 1992). 5  Unsophisticated users 
directly value packaging, because it lowers their information accessing and processing 
costs (Betty and Hand 1992).  “When selective disclosure leads to trading by the 
recipients of the disclosure or trading by those whom these recipients advise, the practice 
bears a close resemblance to ordinary “tipping” and insider trading.  The economic 
effects of the two practices are essentially the same; in both cases, a few persons gain an 
informational edge - - and use that edge to profit at the expense of the uninformed (SEC 
Fair Disclosure Act, p. 21).”6    
Previous research identifies systematic differences in the types of information 
acquired, cost of acquiring information, and information processing abilities of 
institutions and individuals (Kim et al. 1997).  The investor trade size research suggests 
that small traders respond to different information signals than large traders (e.g., 
earnings announcements and annual report filings).  
                                                 
4 Institutions may be superior to individuals in their information processing ability (Kim and Verrichia 
1994 and Bamber and Cheon 1995).  Therefore, institutional investors are considered as the more 
sophisticated trader. 
5 Packaging is the form and manner that information is bundled or presented to users (investors).  For 
example a company can file an 8-K with and without a press release.     
6 SEC Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Section V. Cost-Benefit Analysis, Part A 
Regulation FD: Selective Disclosures, Section 1. Benefits. 
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 Researchers find that large traders have a quicker and stronger reaction to 
earnings announcements relative to smaller traders (Cready 1988 and Lee 1992).  
Frankel et al. 1999 find a similar response to conference calls made after earnings 
announcements.  In contrast, only a small trader response is detected at annual report 
release dates (Cready and Mynatt 1991).          
Researchers examining the information content of Form 8-K filings have 
produced mixed results (e.g., Pastena [1979], Klock [1994], and Carter and Soo [1999]).  
The mixed results are partially explained by the difficulty in identifying the appropriate 
event dates and controlling for confounding disclosures.  Klock (1994, p. 342) states “it 
is not always clear what date the information becomes known to the market.”  Form 8-K 
filings create unique disclosure settings that are different from other accounting 
disclosures such as earnings announcements and  annual reports  The event date is the 
circumstance that requires the filing of an 8-K (e.g., the day a registrant disposes of a 
significant amount of assets).  An 8-K filing is also an event (recognized by the date 
received by the SEC).  The event date and the filing can be on the same day, or the filing 
date can follow from one day to several months later.  A third event is the announcement 
date.  An announcement occurs when a press release or newspaper article discloses the 
event.   The announcement date can also occur concurrently with, before, or after the 
event and filing dates.   Previous studies do not examine 8-K filings as a package of 
disclosure activities, focusing either on the specific event or the filing of the 8-K, but not 
on the sequential information releases.  Using a sample of 1993 Form 8-K filings, I plan 
to construct five unique disclosure settings representing packages of company 
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information.  Each disclosure setting may contain one or more tests of relative investor 
trading.  
Specifically, I will investigate the relative usage of 8-K disclosures using mean 
transaction sizes.  Mean transaction size, measured by the number of shares traded in a 
company’s stock divided by the number of transactions, is used to identify the relative 
mix of trading by investors.  In investor trade size research, larger trades are attributed to 
institutional traders, while smaller transactions are attributed to relatively less wealthy 
individuals.  I assume that investors belong to either the small non-institutional or large 
institutional investor group.  If trade size is a credible proxy for institutional versus 
individual investors trading activities, I will be able to make predictions with regard to 
relative investor use of 8-K disclosures.7  
My findings show that the relative trading activity to 8-K filings is different by 
the type of disclosure.  Relative trading responses were found to be more pronounced in 
disclosure settings that contained a public announcement.  Regulators and standard 
setters might find this important in determining the format of disclosure requirements.  
In addition, the type of Form 8-K disclosure also had an impact on the relative trading 
activity. Form 8-K filings concerning acquisition or disposition of assets had the most 
pronounced differences.   Finally, the relative trading activity to these filings differs 
from other accounting events such as earnings announcements and annual report filings.   
                                                 
7 Mean trade size metrics have been used as proxies for different investor classes in Cready 1988, Cready 
and Mynatt 1991, Lee 1992, Brackney and Cready 1999, and Frankel et al. 1999. 
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I find a negative followed by positive mean transaction size, the opposite of other 
accounting events.      
The remainder of this paper is organized in four sections.  The next section 
provides an overview of investor trade size and Form 8-K research.   In section III, I 
discuss 8-K filings, the research design, the hypotheses, and the sample.  Section IV, 
contains the empirical results, while the last section includes a summary and concluding 
remarks, including limitations and opportunities for future research.         
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Investor Trade Size Research 
Many researchers interested in how accounting information affects investor 
behavior have turned to transactions data.  Using empirical proxies for the type of 
investor, researchers examine how different investor groups react to various news 
signals.  Large and small traders may respond differently to accounting information 
signals (Potter 1992).  The most widely studied event is earnings announcements 
(Cready 1988, Lee 1992, Radhakrishna 1998, and Bhattacharya 2001).  In addition, 
Boone and Raman (2001) examine the differential trading associated with auditor 
resignations versus dismissals, while Cready and Mynatt (1991) investigate investor 
response to the issuance of annual reports.  A recent study by Frankel et al. (1999), 
examines the type of investor response to conference calls.  No study to date has 
examined the differential response to aggregate 8-K filings.  Since 8-Ks disclosures are a 
unique source of accounting information, it is not known what type of response will be 
found.   
Cready (1988) is the first study to investigate the trading behavior of institutional 
versus small investors.  In a sample of NYSE annual and quarterly earnings 
announcements, he finds average transaction size increases around the event dates.   In 
addition, using size-stratified transactions based on the number of shares, Cready 
documents that the speed of a trading response increases with transaction size strata.  
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Consequently, these results are consistent with information value increasing with 
investor wealth. 
Lee (1992) extends Cready’s findings using intraday data on NYSE 
announcements.  He distinguishes between large and small traders using a cutoff 
transaction value of $10,000.  Lee observes a stronger and quicker trading response for 
large traders than for small.  Large traders tend to trade on the announcement date while 
small traders are active for several subsequent days.  Furthermore, small traders tend to 
be net buyers (buyers exceed sellers) regardless of the type of earnings news (good 
versus bad news).  Lee finds that small and large traders have a heterogeneous reaction 
to the same earnings announcement.   
Radhakrishna (1998) investigates the affect of earnings news announcements on 
the trading reactions of different investor groups (individuals, institutions, exchange 
members, specialists, and program trades) using the TORQ database.  The TORQ 
database contains an audit file that provides the trader type for NYSE trades.8   The 
results indicate that institutional traders are major traders in the immediate aftermath of 
an announcement, while individual investors increase their trading, but there is a 
marginal delay in their entry into the market. 
Brackney and Cready (1999) investigate the effect of timeliness on relative 
investor trading responses to annual earnings announcements.   
                                                 
8 The TORQ data set contains trader identification information on 144 firms (mostly NYSE) for the period 
November 1990 to January 1991. 
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Unexpected reporting lag measures timeliness, while mean transaction size 
proxies for relative investor trading.  Results show that timeliness has a significant effect 
on announcement period mean transaction sizes.      
Bhattacharya (2001) hypothesizes that the earnings expectations of small traders 
are associated with predictions from a seasonal random walk model, while large traders’ 
earnings expectations are not. The study finds that small traders’ responses around 
earnings announcements are increasing in the magnitude of seasonal random walk 
forecast errors, even after controlling for absolute analyst forecast errors, 
contemporaneous price changes and market wide trading. He concludes that the segment 
of the market that appears to anchor on the seasonal random walk model is 
disproportionately populated by small traders. 
Cready and Mynatt (1991) examine the price and trading responses to annual 
report release dates.  Using both the number of transactions and a transaction value 
cutoff to proxy for investor type, they observe a trading reaction to annual reports in 
only the smallest trade sizes.  Cready and Mynatt conclude that small investors rely more 
on the annual report than large investors. 
Boone and Raman (2001) examine the trading activity associated with auditor 
dismissals and resignations using the same methodology as Cready and Mynatt (1991); 
however, they examine the dismissals and resignations using intraday trading data.   The 
authors find auditor resignations informative only to low wealth investors, and conclude 
that this suggests that sophisticated investors can anticipate auditor resignations based on 
an analysis of publicly available litigation risk data. 
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Frankel et al. (1999) examine the characteristics of firms that hold conference 
calls, whether these calls are informative, and whether these calls provide equal access to 
all investors.  To test for equal access to conference calls, an average trade size metric, 
volume divided by the number of transactions, is analyzed.  Average trade size is higher 
during the time of the conference calls, indicating that large investors are using these 
selective disclosures.  The SEC Regulation Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading 
(2000) references this study in footnote 144 as an example of the need for a level access 
to information.   
8-K Research 
Research examining the information content of Form 8-K filings has produced 
mixed results (e.g., Pastena [1979], Fried and Schiff [1981], Johnson and Lys [1990], 
and Carter and Soo [1999]).  The majority of studies testing the usefulness of Form 8-K 
filings focus on the disclosure of auditor changes.  However, studies have also 
investigated unusual charges (Pastena 1979) and foreign-sensitive payment disclosures 
(Smith et al. 1984).  Only one study, Carter and Soo (1999), perform aggregate testing 
across all 8-K disclosure items.  The mixed results are partially explained by the 
difficulty in identifying the appropriate event dates and controlling for confounding 
disclosures.   
Pastena (1979) is the first study to examine if stock prices react to 8-K filings.  
He relies on Hakansson’s (1977) theory that mandatory interim disclosures will be 
beneficial to financial statement users, especially those who lack access to “inside 
information.”  In 1973, registrants were required to disclose material developments 
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immediately through informal press releases and to provide a more detailed disclosure in 
approximately one month in Form 8-K.9   Using three-day event windows around both 
the press release and the SEC filing, Pastena finds a significant price response to unusual 
events for only the press releases.10   He concludes that the market has already fully 
reacted to the new information by the time of the 8-K filing.  
Smith et al. (1984) investigate how common stock investors interpret foreign-
sensitive payment disclosures.  The authors identify the event date as the earlier of the 
date received stamp on the 8-K, the date indicated in the 8-K text, or the date disclosed 
in The Wall Street Journal.  Significant negative abnormal returns are detected on the 
day prior to and the day of the disclosure.      
Fried and Schiff (1981) began a line of research examining the general question 
of whether CPA switches are associated with significant market reactions.  In 1971, the 
SEC required an 8-K filing within 15 days of a change in the registrant’s certifying 
accountant.  They also required registrants to describe any disagreements with the CPA 
firms occurring within the previous 18 months.  Fried and Schiff use 8-K filings dates as 
announcement dates.  Their results for both 21- and 49- week abnormal returns 
surrounding the event week show that the 8-K disclosure of auditor disagreements is not 
informative.  Only a small effect is detected for the auditor switches.   
                                                 
9 In 1973, the 8-K must be filed within ten days subsequent to the close of the month in which a designated 
material event occurred. 
10 Unusual events were expanded by Accounting Series Release 138 to include “material write-downs of 
inventories, receivables, or deferred R&D costs, provisions for loss on major long-term contracts or 
purchase commitments, and losses on disposition of assets or business segments.” 
 
  
12
Smith and Nichols (1982) also test the usefulness of the SEC requirements for 
disclosure of auditor firm disagreements.  Smith and Nichols improve the Fried and 
Schiff (1981) design by eliminating firms with confounding Wall Street Journal articles 
or earnings announcements.  They also use a one week test window, a matched pair 
design of other auditor switching firms (without disagreements), and a larger sample 
size.  A statistically significant difference in market reaction is observed between the 
disclosure and non-disclosure firms using the 8-K stamp date as the event week.   
Johnson and Lys (1990) test for abnormal returns to auditor realignments filings.  
The authors do not control for the presence of contemporaneous 8-K disclosures (such as 
technical defaults, election of directors, etc.) because they are unlikely to be independent 
of auditor change.  Therefore, daily excess returns capture the combined effects of 
auditor realignment and concurrent events.  No abnormal daily returns are documented 
on day 0 or days –1, 0, +1 for switching firms.  In addition, the results are not sensitive 
to auditor disagreements.   Johnson and Lys conclude that auditor changes provide little 
information that is relevant for the pricing of securities. 
Klock (1994) models the daily abnormal returns of 8-K auditor change filings 
using three separate event dates.  He states it is not always clear what date the 
information becomes known to the market.  First, he locates the date disclosed within the 
8-K on which the auditor is formally terminated.  Second, he records the 8-K stamp or 
filing date.  Third, he uses the on-file date (when the 8-K becomes available in the public 
reference room at the SEC), which is usually 0-3 days after the second event date.  None 
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of the returns are significant at conventional levels, suggesting that the investing public 
does not believe there is new information in auditor switches.         
Schwartz and Soo (1995) test 8-K disclosures of auditor changes by firms 
approaching bankruptcy.  They examine if these filings provide useful information such 
as alerting investors and regulators of impending bankruptcy.  Bankrupt firms are more 
likely to miss 8-K deadlines and report bad news events (e.g.., reporting disagreements).  
The researchers examine The Wall Street Journal Index to see if auditor changes are 
reported prior to the filing date.  No abnormal returns are found for either the event date 
(date of auditor change reported in the 8-K) or the filing date (date the 8-K filed with the 
SEC) over the seven days surrounding each date.   
DeFond et al. (1997) assert that auditor resignations differ from other auditor 
changes and test this using two event windows.  The first window is the day of the 
auditor change through the day before the 8-K is filed.  The second window runs from 
the 8-K filing date plus four more days.  A significant negative reaction is found for only 
the resignation firms in the first event window.  Both types of changes are negative and 
significant in the second event window.  The authors conclude that the distinction 
between resignations and dismissals is meaningful, but that news of resignations 
frequently reaches the market before Form 8-K is filed.        
Wells and Loudder (1997) examine the market response to auditor changes 
distinguishing between auditor resignations and dismissals.  Abnormal returns are 
examined using a two day event period with the SEC Form 8-K stamp date as day zero.  
Significantly negative returns are found only when auditors resign.   
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In the most comprehensive examination to date of 8-K filings, Carter and Soo 
(1999) investigate the timeliness of and stock price reaction to a 1993 sample of 5,736 
filings.  In tests without regard to the type of disclosure, Carter and Soo find a price 
response to both the event date and the filing date.11   Additional cross-sectional tests are 
performed based on the size of the firm, exchange listing, filing compliance, and filing 
lag.   A significant price reaction is found only for the smallest firms, listed on 
NASDAQ, filed on time, and with a filing lag of less than seven days.  These findings 
are consistent with Pastena (1979) in that delayed filings are being preempted by more 
timely sources.  Carter and Soo (1999) do not examine the type of investor response to 
8-K event dates.   
 Shu (2000) investigates the information content of auditor resignations reported 
on Form 8-K.  She finds a significant negative three-day return of 3.11% for days -1, 0, 
and +1.  Day 0 is defined as the first trading day after the filing (stamp) date of the 8-K 
announcing the auditor resignation.  Shu concludes that investors react negatively to 
auditor resignations.    
 Whisenant et al. (2003) examine disclosures of auditor changes included in Form 
8-K filings.  The SEC requires registrants to disclose when auditors advise clients of 
internal control weaknesses or material financial statement reliability issues.   
                                                 
11 The event date is the circumstance that requires the filing of an 8-K (e.g., the date a registrant purchases 
another company).  The filing date is the day the SEC received the Form 8-K. 
 
  
15
Each type of disclosure is tested using both three-day (-1,0, +1) and seven-day (-5 to +1 
day) windows.  Whisenant et al. find a significant negative stock price reaction to 
disclosures of reportable events but not to internal control disclosures, and suggest that 
these events may be predictable to investors.           
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CHAPTER III 
 
FORM 8-K FILINGS 
 
 
The SEC requires that an electronic Form 8-K be filed for certain events not 
previously disclosed in Form 10-K or 10-Q.  The events are: Changes in Control of 
Registrant (Item 1); Acquisition or Disposition of Assets (Item 2); Bankruptcy or 
Receivership (Item 3); Changes in Registrant’s Certifying Accountant (Item 4); Other 
Events (Item 5); Resignations of Registrant’s Directors (Item 6); Financial Statements 
and Exhibits (Item 7); Change in Fiscal Year (Item 8); and Regulation FD Disclosure 
(Item 9).  Item 5 disclosures are voluntary.  They include other unspecified events 
deemed important and can include lawsuits, securities issuances, earnings 
announcements, and credit rating changes.  Overall, 8-Ks contain important accounting 
information, which should be useful to investors.12   
SEC rules require 8-K filings for items 1, 2, 3, or 8 to be made within fifteen 
calendar days after the occurrence of a triggering event.  For items 4 and 6 the disclosure 
must be made within five business days.  The voluntary disclosures under item 5 have no 
filing date requirements.  In August 2002, the SEC proposed to provide investors with 
better and faster disclosure of important corporate events (SEC Proposed Rule: 
Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date).   
                                                 
12   Previous research studies have focused on the differential use of earnings announcements (Cready 
1988 and Lee 1992) and annual report filings (Cready and Mynatt 1991) by large and small investors. 
Both earnings announcements and the filing of annual or quarterly financial statements under item 5 of the 
Form 8-K will be eliminated from my sample.   
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Eleven new items were added to the 8-K disclosures (e.g., material impairments 
and restructurings) and the filing date was reduced to two business days.   
The filing of an 8-K will have either two or three separate events.  The event date 
(ED) is the circumstance that requires the filing of an 8-K (e.g., the day a registrant 
disposes of a significant amount of assets).  The 8-K filing itself is an event and will be 
noted as the filing date (FD), which is the date the Form 8-K is received by the SEC.  
The ED and the FD can be on the same day or the FD can follow from one day to several 
months later.  A third event is the announcement date (AD), which is the date a press 
release or newspaper article discloses the event.   The AD can also occur before, 
concurrently with, or after the ED and FD.  Every 8-K filing will include an ED and a 
FD.  An AD may or may not occur because it is an elective disclosure by the registrant.        
Figure 1 presents each combination based on the perspective of individually 
testing each of the three separate events.  Ten possible combinations can occur involving 
the ED and FD which are shown in Panel A, while eight combinations are associated 
with the AD in Panel B.   Each possible combination is presented in the same order for 
each of the three events (ED, FD, and AD).  A dash mark (-) indicates a separation of 
two events by several days, while a slash (/) a concurrent event. For example, ED – FD 
is an event date preceding a filing date and ED – FD / AD is an event date preceding a 
concurrent FD and AD.  Each event can be tested individually as shown in Section 1 of 
Panels A and B.  Concurrent events such as an ED and FD occurring on the same day are 
combined and tested as shown in Sections 2 and 3. 
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Figure 1. Analysis of the Event, Filing, and Announcement Date Combinationsa 
Panel A: Event and Filing Date Combinations 
EVENT DATES (ED) FILING DATES (FD) 
Section 1  Section 1   
ED – FD ED – FD 
ED – FD / AD Na 
ED – FD – AD ED – FD – AD 
ED – AD – FD ED – AD – FD 
All Event Dates 
Tested Alone 
Not Applicable (na) 
All Filing Dates 
Tested Alone 
ED / AD – FD 
 na  na 
 na  na 
 AD – ED - FD  AD – ED – FD  
Section 2  Section 2  
ED / FD ED / FDb ED concurrent 
with a FD ED / FD – AD 
FD concurrent 
with an ED ED / FDb– AD 
 AD – ED / FD  AD – ED / FDb  
Section 3  Section 3  
ED / AD – FD na ED concurrent 
with an AD ED / AD / FD 
 
ED / AD / FDb 
 na  
FD concurrent 
with an AD 
ED – FD / AD 
 
 
 Panel B: Announcement Date Combinations 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATES (AD) 
 Section 1  
na 
na 
ED – FD – AD 
ED – AD – FD 
na 
ED / FD – AD 
AD – ED / FD 
All 
Announcement 
Dates Tested 
Alone 
AD – ED – FD  
Section 2  
na ED and FD 
concurrent dates na 
 na 
Section 3  
ED / ADb – FD 
ED / AD / FD b 
 
AD concurrent 
with an ED or a 
FD ED – FD / ADb 
 
a All possible scenarios involving EDs, FDs, and ADs are organized based on if the events will be tested 
alone (Section 1) or in combination with another event (Sections 2 and 3).  A dash mark (-) indicates a 
separation of two events by several days, while a slash (/) a concurrent event  (e.g., ED – FD is an event 
date preceding a filing date, ED – FD / AD is an event date preceding a concurrent FD and AD). 
b These event combinations are identical to previously listed combinations.    
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
My investigation begins with all Form 8-Ks filed with the SEC in 1993.13  In 
order to identify if an AD exists relating to the ED, I examine both the SEC filed 8-K 
and an information database.14  Next, I generate a proxy for the relative trading activity 
of different investor groups.  Finally, I identify five unique informational settings in 
which 8-K filings occur.    
Relative Trading Response Design 
 
Relative trading activity can be used to proxy for the type of investor, that is, 
large versus small traders, and is measured using mean transaction size in shares (Cready 
1988, Cready and Mynatt 1991, Brackney and Cready 1999, Frankel et al. 1999).  Mean 
transaction size (MEANTRS) is calculated as 
   MEANTRSit = DAYVOLit / DTRANSit,   (1) 
where 
 
 DAYVOLit = the total volume in firm i’s stock on day t, 
  DTRANSit = the daily number of transactions occurring in firm i’s stock on day t. 
 
I will use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to estimate the expected 
mean transaction sizes using the regression 
                                                 
13   This is the same initial sample used by Carter and Soo (1999) to test the relevance of Form 8-K reports.  
14   The wires files of Lexis-Nexis were searched for a period of five days before the ED and five days 
after the FD to determine if and when the company issued a press release relating to the 8-K event.  
Similar to Dodd et al. (1984) and Dopuch et al. (1986) I use a press release source (like the broad tape) to 
circumvent the editorial selection process of The Wall Street Journal or other news services.   
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MEANTRSit = ai + bi (DAYt) + eit,    (2) 
where 
 
MEANTRSit = the mean transaction size in shares for transactions occurring in firm i’s  
  stock on day t, 
             DAYt = the trading day per the daily CRSP tape, 
                    ai =  regression specific estimated intercept term for firm i, 
                    bi =  regression specific estimated slope term for firm i, and  
                    eit =  the regression specific error term. 
 
The OLS regression is designed to estimate any trend in MEANTRS.  Unexpected mean 
transaction size is then estimated as 
 
UMEANTRSit = (MEANTRSit – MEANTRSHATit)             (3) 
where 
 
MEANTRSHAT  = the expected mean transaction size in shares based on  
        the intercept and slope parameters from equation (2). 
   
The expectations model is estimated using all trading days in 1993 excluding the event 
period windows.  Each firm’s actual, expected, and unexpected mean transaction size is 
then standardized by the following equation 
SMEANTRSit = MEANTRS * 〉〈 ∑ iSTNDDEVSTNDDEVi /1/1 *N     (4) 
where 
SMEANTRS it = the standardized actual MEANTRSit, expected MEANTRSHATit, and  
                             unexpected UMEANTRSit,     
    STNDDEVi =  the standard deviation of the error terms from equation (2), and 
          N =  the sample size.  
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Each hypothesis will be tested using cross-sectional t-tests with an overall event period 
window (-1, 0, +1, +2, +3, +4).15  For example, in the disclosure scenario where an ED 
and an AD occur on the same day and are followed by a FD, the hypotheses will be 
tested as shown in Figure 2.  Any of the three events that occur within one day of each 
other will be considered to have occurred together.  For example, if an ED occurs one 
day before a FD, the two events will be combined with the first event being day zero in 
the analysis period.  If three events occur on three consecutive trading days the middle 
event date will generally be day zero in the analysis period. 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of 8-K Testing Windowsa 
 
           
ED/ADb  Test Window  -1 0 +1 +2 +3     
           
FDb  Test Window       -1 0 +1  
           
March 1993 Trading 
Days 
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 10 11 12 
         
         
   
 
    
 
  
 ED/AD Event   FD Event  
  
 
(Concurrent disclosure, 
Hypothesis H1a)  
(AD precedes 
FD, Hypothesis 
H4b) 
 
a Testing windows for a disposition of a corporate asset (8-K item 2) and the issuance of a press release the 
same day (concurrent disclosure), preceding a FD five trading days later. 
 
b ED = Event date, FD = Filing date, and AD = Announcement date. 
 
 
                                                 
15   The length of some event windows will differ based on the type of disclosure.   See Hypothesis 
Section.   
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Lee (1992) and Bhattacharya (2001) find that almost 95 percent of trading 
responses for both small and large trades occur within three days of the earnings 
announcement.  Cready and Mynatt (1991) analyzed investor trading surrounding annual 
report filings for 1981 to 1983 fiscal year ends.  They find a trading response for 
individual traders concentrated in the day +3 to +7 period on paper filings of annual 
reports with the SEC made over a decade before my sample year of 1993.16  
Hypotheses 
 
Based upon a review of the 8-K filings, the event period window described 
above, and my research questions, the ten combinations of the three event dates can be 
further classified into five main disclosure settings.  The disclosure settings will be 
designated as: 1) Concurrent first, 2) Event first, 3) AD preceding FD, 4) FD preceding 
AD, and 5) Other.  Figure 3 provides a listing of the five disclosure settings and a 
linkage to the hypothesis tests.  In each disclosure setting the ED, FD, and AD events are 
combined and listed by their separate hypotheses.  Certain tests are conditional on 
previous tests.  Also, the event window’s size (in days) will change based on which 
combination is being tested.  Both of these are explained within the unique disclosure 
settings.  
 
                                                 
16   The event period window length becomes an empirical trade off between sample size and power versus 
using filing dates that are past their statutory due dates.  Carter and Soo (1999) find a price response only 
on 8-K filings that are made on time (or with a filing lag of seven days or less).     
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Figure 3. Summary of Disclosure Settings and Linkage to Hypothesis Tests 
 
Panel A: Hypothesis H1 to H3 
    EVENT WINDOW TESTS 
 
 
 
 
Events 
 
 
HO 
Conditional On 
Previous 
Hypothesis  
 
Days 
–1 to +1 
 
Days 
+2 to +4 
 
Days 
–1 to +3 
ED / AD / FDa H1a - > 0 < 0 - 
ED / AD – FD H1a - > 0 < 0 - 
ED / FD H1b - > 0 - - 
Concurrent 
First 
Setting 
ED / FD – AD H1b - > 0 - - 
       
ED – FD H2 - - - > 0 Event First 
Setting ED – FD / AD H2 - - - > 0 
 ED – FD – AD H2 - - - > 0 
 ED – AD – FD H2 - - - > 0 
       
Tests of FD 
Events: 
     
ED – FD – AD H3a If (H2)  
UMEANTRS > 0 
? - - 
FD 
Precedes 
AD Setting 
ED – FD – AD H3a If (H2)  
UMEANTRS = 0 
> 0 - - 
 Tests of AD 
Events: 
     
 ED – FD – AD H3b If (H2 or H3a) 
UMEANTRS > 0 
- < 0 - 
 ED – FD – AD H3b If (H2 or H3a) 
UMEANTRS = 0 
> 0 < 0 - 
 ED / FD – AD H3c If (H1b)  
UMEANTRS > 0 
- < 0 - 
 ED / FD – AD H3c If (H1b)  
UMEANTRS = 0 
> 0 < 0 - 
 
a ED = Event date, FD= Filing date, and AD = Announcement date. 
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Figure 3.  (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Hypothesis H4 to H6 
    EVENT WINDOW TESTS 
 
 
 
 
Events 
 
 
HO 
Conditional On 
Previous 
Hypothesis  
 
Days 
–1 to +1 
 
Days 
+2 to +4 
 
Days 
–1 to +3 
Tests of ADa 
Events: 
     
ED – AD – FD H4a If (H2) 
UMEANTRS > 0 
- < 0 - 
ED – AD – FD H4a If (H2) 
UMEANTRS = 0 
> 0 < 0 - 
Announce
ment 
Preceding 
Filing Date 
Setting 
Tests of FD 
Events: 
     
 ED – AD – FD H4b If (H2 or H4a) 
UMEANTRS ≠ 0 
? - - 
ED – AD – FD H4b If (H2 or H4a) 
UMEANTRS = 0 
> 0 - -  
ED / AD – FD H4c If (H1a) 
UMEANTRS ≠ 0 
? - - 
 ED / AD – FD H4c If (H1a) 
UMEANTRS = 0 
> 0 - - 
       
 ED – AD / FD H5a If (H2) 
UMEANTRS > 0 
- < 0 - 
ED – AD / FD H5a If (H2) 
UMEANTRS = 0 
> 0 < 0 - 
ED – FD H5b If (H2) 
UMEANTRS > 0 
? - - 
Other 
Disclosure 
Setting 
ED – FD H5b If (H2) 
UMEANTRS = 0 
> 0b - - 
 AD – ED / FD H6a  > 0 < 0 - 
 AD – ED – FD H6a  > 0 < 0 - 
 AD – ED / FD H6b If (H6a) 
UMEANTRS ≠ 0 
? - - 
 AD – ED / FD H6b If (H6a) 
UMEANTRS = 0 
> 0 - - 
 AD – ED – FD H6c If (H6a) 
UMEANTRS ≠ 0 
? - - 
       
 
a ED = Event date, FD = Filing date, and AD = Announcement date. 
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Concurrent Disclosure Settings  
In the first concurrent disclosure setting the event date, filing date, and 
announcement date occur concurrently.17  The first hypothesis (H1a) examines 
disclosure settings that include a press release (AD).  Cready (1988) and Lee (1992) 
suggest that institutional investors react more quickly than small individual investors to 
accounting news.  Therefore, the first hypothesis (H1a) predicts a differential trading 
activity that includes more large traders (UMEANTRS > 0) followed more small traders 
(UMEANTRS < 0).  Radhakrishna (1998) finds institutional reaction to earnings 
announcements is virtually instantaneous while individuals lag in their trading response.  
Consequently, the differential trading activity (UMEANTRS > 0) will be tested using 
event days –1 to +1, while the differential trading activity (UMEANTRS < 0) will use 
days +2 to +4.   
The second concurrent disclosure setting does not have a concurrent AD.  In 
hypothesis (H1b), I test for an investor response to a concurrent ED and FD. Carter and 
Soo (1999) find a price reaction to timely filed 8-Ks (FD) but do not examine usage by 
investor type.  Institutional investors dedicate substantial resources to information search  
(Potter 1992).  Accordingly, institutional investors are more likely to follow 8-K filings 
(without public announcements).  I predict an UMEANTRS > 0 for H1b using event 
days –1 and +1.    
 
                                                 
17   The SEC Fair Disclosure Act requires companies to file either an 8-K or other method of broad public 
access (such as a press release) within 24 hours of an unintentional disclosure of material non-public 
information.  Both concurrent disclosure settings would be similar to the SEC requirement.   
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Event First Disclosure Setting     
This disclosure setting results when a FD or AD does not immediately follow the 
event that initiates the filing of an 8-K, that is, the registrant waits several days before 
filing an 8-K or issuing a press release.  The second hypothesis (H2) is a test of trading 
activity at the event date (ED).  Carter and Soo (1999) find a price reaction to the ED; 
however their methodology deleted only firms with a FD within two days of the ED.  I 
use five days, resulting in a cleaner test because the possibility of the influence of 
confounding events will be less.  My design allows a test of information dissemination 
when no public filing or announcement has occurred.  “When selective disclosure leads 
to trading by the recipients of the disclosure or trading by those whom these recipients 
advise, the practice bears a close resemblance to ordinary “tipping” and insider trading.  
The economic effects of the two practices are essentially the same; in both cases, a few 
persons gain an informational edge - - and use that edge to profit at the expense of the 
uninformed (SEC Fair Disclosure Act, p. 21).”18  Since no public information is 
available, I expect that if differential trading activity is found on days –1 to +3, it will be 
found in the more informed institutional proxy (UMEANTRS > 0).  
The differential trading activity to the third, fourth, and fifth disclosure settings 
(FD precedes AD, AD precedes FD, and Other) may be conditional on the findings in 
H1a, H1b, H2, H3a, H4a, or H6a.   
                                                 
18 SEC Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Section V. Cost-Benefit Analysis, Part A 
Regulation FD: Selective Disclosures, Section 1. Benefits. 
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For example, an ED followed by an AD and then by a FD, the expected 
differential trading activity to the AD changes based on the trading observed to the ED.  
This can occur because the investors may have already fully reacted to the new 
information by the time the subsequent AD or FD is disclosed (Pastena 1979).  
Filing Preceding Announcement Date Disclosure Setting   
This disclosure setting occurs when the FD precedes the AD.  It is expected that 
this disclosure setting will contain the least observations in my sample.  Hypothesis H3a 
examines a sequential disclosure setting of an ED followed by a FD followed by an AD.  
H3a tests the FD.  Here the predictions are conditional on the markets response to the 
ED (H2).  If large investors relative to small trade on the ED (UMEANTRS > 0) then it 
is uncertain what relative type of trading activity will occur at the FD (most likely none, 
therefore no prediction is made for UMEANTRS).  However, if no relative activity is 
detected at the ED then an UMEANTRS > 0 is predicted at the FD using event days –1 
to +1.   
Hypothesis H3b tests the AD portion of the ED followed by FD followed by AD 
combination.  An UMEANTRS > 0 is expected at the ED (H2) and or the FD (H3a); 
therefore an UMEANTRS < 0 is expected at the subsequent AD (days +2 to +4).     
Another combination of the third disclosure setting is an AD that follows a 
concurrent ED and FD (H3b).  Since a differential trading activity including more large 
traders is predicted on the concurrent ED and FD (as in H1b) a subsequent public 
announcement will attract a higher proportion of small traders.  As a result, an 
UMEANTRS < 0 is predicted using event days +2 to +4. 
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Announcement Preceding Filing Date Disclosure Setting   
This disclosure setting occurs when the AD precedes the FD.  Hypothesis H4a 
examines a sequential disclosure setting of an ED followed by an AD followed by a FD.  
H4a tests the AD.  Here the predictions are conditional on the differential trading activity 
to the ED (H2).  If relatively more large investors trade on the ED (UMEANTRS > 0) 
then an UMEANTRS < 0 is predicted at the AD using event days +2 to +4.  
Alternatively, if no relative activity is detected at the ED then an UMEANTRS > 0 
followed by an UMEANTRS < 0 (similar to H1a) is expected using days –1 to +1 and 
+2 to +4, respectively.   
Hypothesis H4b tests the FD of a disclosure setting where the ED is followed by 
an AD followed by a FD.  Since investors can react to both the ED (H2) and the AD 
(H4a) little or no relative trading is expected at the FD.19           
Disclosure setting four can also have an FD that follows a concurrent ED and AD 
(H4c).  A large followed by a small differential trading activity is predicted on the 
concurrent ED and AD (H1a).  Any subsequent FD is not expected to have a differential 
trading activity (unless it contains new information, in which case UMEANTRS > 0 is 
predicted. 
Other Disclosure Setting   
 This disclosure setting (Other) contains the remaining untested events.  In 
hypothesis H5a, I test a concurrent AD and FD that follows an ED.   
                                                 
19   Unless the FD contains additional useful information then UMEANTRS > 0 is expected. 
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Similar to the disclosure settings above, the expectations are conditional on the 
differential trading activity to the ED.  If more large investors relative to small investors 
are observed at the ED (UMEANTRS > 0, as in H2), then an UMEANTRS < 0 is 
predicted at the FD / AD using event days +2 to +4.  Alternatively if no relative activity 
is detected at the ED, then an UMEANTRS > 0 followed by an UMEANTRS < 0 
(similar to H1a) is expected using days –1 to +1 and +2 to +4, respectively. 
Hypothesis 5b examines the scenario where a FD follows an ED.  This may be 
the most common type of filing.  Again, the prediction is conditional on the ED activity.  
A large differential trading activity is predicted on the ED (H2).  Any subsequent FD 
will not have a differential trading activity (UMEANTRS=? for days -1 to +1, unless it 
contains new information and then an UMEANTRS > 0 would occur).  Alternatively, if 
no differential trading activity is detected at the ED then an UMEANTRS > 0 is 
expected on days –1 to +1.      
A final combination of events contains an AD preceding the ED and FD.  
Registrants may in some situations disclose an event before it occurs.20  In hypothesis 
6a, I test for differential trading activity to such an announcement.  Consistent with H1a 
a large relative trading activity (UMEANTRS > 0) will be tested using event days –1 to 
+1, while the small relative trading activity (UMEANTRS < 0) will use days +2 to +4.  
 
 
 
                                                 
20   For example, a corporation preparing to issue equity or debt securities may issue a press release several 
days prior to the sale attempting to increase the demand for its offering.  
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Hypothesis 6b examines the scenario where a concurrent ED and FD follow an 
AD.  The predicted trading activity to the ED/FD is conditional on the relative investor’s 
observed activity to H6a on the AD.  A large followed by small differential trading 
activity is predicted on the AD, therefore any subsequent ED/FD will not have a trading 
response (UMEANTRS=? for days -1 to +1, unless it contains new information and then 
an UMEANTRS > 0 would occur).  Alternatively, if no relative trading activity is 
detected at the AD then an UMEANTRS > 0 is expected on days –1 to +1.  Finally, in 
the combination AD – ED – FD the predictions are the same as H6b.       
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CHAPTER V 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
Sample Selection Procedure 
My investigation begins with all Form 8-Ks filed with the SEC in 1993.21  All 
amendments to previous reports, duplicates, reports with missing dates, and identical or 
similar filings made by related companies are excluded.  A firm may file more than one 
Form 8-K in 1993.  An initial sample of 1,966 firms who filed 3,209 reports results from 
this procedure.   
Five selection screens are used to determine the initial sample size for the 
disclosure scenarios.  I reduce the sample for firms that have: (1) no available CUSIP or 
trading information, or material changes in outstanding shares;22 (2) less than eight 
transactions per day; (3) less than 105 days available for estimation of mean trade sizes; 
(4) events or announcements occurring in 1992 or 1994; and (5) filings not meeting any 
of the disclosure setting requirements.  The first two screens are needed because changes 
in outstanding shares and thinly-traded issues affect volume and trading statistics as well 
as tests of significance.  Screen (3) assures that there are at least 100 observations for the 
time-series regressions used to estimate the expected mean trade size, while the fourth 
screen eliminates event dates outside the 1993 calendar year.  The final screen eliminates 
any combinations of the ED, AD, and FD that do not fall into one of the five disclosure 
                                                 
21   This is the same initial sample used by Carter and Soo (1999) to test the information content of Form 
8-K filings.   
22   A material change is defined as any change in outstanding shares between January 4, 1993 and 
December 31, 1993 of more than ten percent 
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settings as described above.  The use of these criteria resulted in a final sample of 523 
firms with 743 filings as shown in Table 1.     
 
 
Table 1. Sample Selection Criteria  
 
 Firms Filings
  
All Form 8-Ks filed in 1993 excluding duplicates, amendments, 
and missing information 
1,966 3,209
  
Delete observations with missing CUSIPs, transaction 
information, or material changes in outstanding shares  
 
(773) 
 
(1,320)
 1,193 1,887
  
Delete firms that have fewer than eight transactions per day (360) (510)
 833 1,377
  
Delete firms with less than 105 days available for estimation of the 
mean trade size 
 
(130) 
 
(231)
 703 1,146
  
Delete firms 1992 event or announcement dates (41) (78)
 662 1,068
  
Less filings not meeting at least one of the disclosure setting 
requirements 
(186) (395)
  
Overall disclosure setting sample 476 673
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The overall disclosure setting sample size is divided among the five disclosure 
settings: Concurrent first, 2) Event first, 3) AD preceding FD, 4) FD preceding AD, and 
5) Other.  An 8-K filing can be placed into more than one disclosure setting.  For 
example, an event date followed by an 8-K filing, ED – FD, will be in both disclosure 
setting two and five.  The ED will tested in the event first disclosure setting and the FD 
will be tested in the other setting.  Table 2 details the number of firms and filings by the 
five disclosure settings.  Two additional screens are necessary to test hypotheses H1a- 
H6c.  Firms with no trading information or missing trading information during the event 
windows are eliminated.  The concurrent first setting contains the most filings (356), 
while no observations existed for the disclosure setting where filing dates precede 
announcement dates.  In addition, the sample sizes for hypotheses H4a, H4b, H5a, H6a, 
H6b, and H6c are very small, so no relative trading tests are performed on these 
hypotheses.   
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Table 2.  Sample Sizes by Disclosure Setting 
 
 Firmsa Filings
  
Setting 1) Concurrent first (ED/FD/AD, ED/AD – FD and 
ED/FD)b 
400 491
  Less firms filing earnings announcements or financials (47) (67)
  Less firms with no trading information during the event windows (30) (46)
  Less firms with missing observations during the event windows  (19) (22)
           304 356
  
Setting 2) Event first  (ED - FD, ED – FD- AD, ED – FD/AD, and 
ED - AD - FD) 
137 165
  Less firms filing earnings announcements or financials (1) (1)
  Less firms with no trading information during the event windows (15) (28)
  Less firms with missing observations during the event windows (11) (11)
           110 125
  
Setting 3) FD precedes AD (ED - FD - AD and ED/FD - AD) 0 0
  
Setting 4) AD Precedes FD (ED - AD - FD and ED/AD - FD) 
 (H4b filings only)c 
190 221
  Less firms filing earnings announcements or financials (12) (17)
  Less firms with no trading information during the event windows (23) (29)
  Less firms with missing observations during the event windows (17) (17)
           138 158
  
Setting 5) Other (ED - AD/FD, ED – FD, AD – ED/FD and AD – 
ED - FD)  (H5b filings only)c     
117 142
  Less firms filing earnings announcements or financials (1) (1)
  Less firms with no trading information during the event windows (11) (20)
  Less firms with missing observations during the event windows (11) (11)
           94 110
 
a Firms can have multiple filings within the year.  Also, a filing can be placed into more than one 
disclosure setting (e.g., an event date followed by an 8-K filing, ED – FD, will be in both 
disclosure setting two and five).   
 
b ED = Event date, FD = Filing date, and AD = Announcement date. A dash mark (-) indicates a 
separation of two events by several days, while a slash (/) a concurrent event. 
 
c The number of 8-K (firms, filings) for hypotheses H4a, H4b, H5a, H6a, H6b, and H6c are (2, 
2), (2, 2), (10, 10), (15, 16), (9, 10), and (6, 6), respectively.  Due to the inadequate sample 
sizes, no testing will be performed on these observations.   
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on trading metrics, filings by individual 8-
K items, and number of 8-Ks filed by firm.23  In Panel A, the average transaction size in 
shares is 1,825.  This average is higher than Cready (1988) and Cready and Mynatt 
(1991) who used samples from the early 1980’s.  Average transaction sizes rose between 
their time period and mine.  The average shares per reported trade from the NYSE 2001 
fact book for the full year 1988 were 2,303.  This average is for the larger NYSE 
companies only.  My sample includes many firms on the Nasdaq and AMSE exchanges 
which have less overall volume and liquidity.     
Table 3, Panel B, analyzes the filings by type of 8-K event.  Two-thirds of all 
filings are included in the “other” item, which includes unspecified events deemed 
important and can include lawsuits, securities issuances, credit-rating changes, and 
earnings announcements.  Almost twenty percent of the filings report the acquisition or 
disposition of assets.  Observed dispersion of filings of 8-K items is similar to Carter and 
Soo (1999). 
                                                 
23   The data used to calculate the expected and actual mean transaction sizes comes from the Trade and 
Quote (TAQ) database.  TAQ contains intraday transaction data (trades and quotes) for all securities listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX), as well as Nasdaq 
National Market System (NMS) and Small Cap issues.  Information on the outstanding number of shares, 
listed stock exchange, market returns, and market capitalization for each company comes from the Center 
for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP).    
  
36
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for 476 Firms and 673 8-K Filings for 1993 
 
Panel A: Continuous Variables 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Average Daily Trading 
Volume in Shares 
158,984 312,822 3,652 3,451,601
Average Number of 
Transactions  
85.25 181.31 8.12 2,731.56
Mean Transaction Size in 
Shares 
1,824.6 1,006.5 351.4 11,220.8
Average Daily Percentage 
Volume 
0.5513% 0.5067% 0.0087% 4.0142%
Panel B: Number of Form 8-K Filings by Type of Event 
 
8-K Item 
Number of 
Observations 
Percentage of 
 Total Filings 
Item 1: Changes in Control 10 1.49
Item 2: Acquisition or Disposition of Assets 134 19.91
Item 3: Bankruptcy or Receivership 3 0.45
Item 4: Changes in Certifying Accountants 15 2.23
Item 5: Other Important Events 451 67.01
Item 6: Resignations of Directors 3 0.45
Item 7: Other Exhibits 56 8.32
Item 8: Change in Fiscal Year 1 0.15
Total 673 100.00
 
Panel C: Number of 8-K Filings by Firm 
 
Number of 8-Ks Filed 
Number of 
Observations 
Percentage of 
Total Filings 
One 413 61.37
Two 141 20.95
Three 58 8.62
Four 24 3.57
Five 15 2.23
Six 6 0.89
Seven 4 0.59
Eight 3 0.45
Nine 2 0.30
Ten 1 0.15
Eleven 1 0.15
Twelve 1 0.15
Thirteen 1 0.15
Fourteen 1 0.15
Fifteen 1 0.15
Seventeen 1 0.15
Total 673 100.00
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Each firm can file more than one Form 8-K during the 1993 calendar year. In 
Table 3, Panel C, the number of filings per firm is detailed.  Over ninety percent of the 
firms filed one to three Form 8-K filings in 1993.  The extreme was seventeen filings for 
one registrant.    
Relative Trading Response 
 
 Separate analyses are performed on each of the five disclosure settings detailed 
in Tables 4 - 8.  The table on p. 46 contains the analysis of relative trading by type of 8-
K item filed.  The relative trading activity is used to proxy for the type of investor and is 
measured using mean transaction size in shares.   
Concurrent Disclosure Setting  
Concurrent disclosures have an ED combined with either a FD, AD or both.  
Table 4 reports standardized mean differences in actual less expected mean transaction 
sizes for the concurrent disclosure setting.  Panel A reports results for H1a, which 
includes concurrent disclosures that include an AD, while Panel B reports results for 
H1b disclosures containing only a FD.  The first hypothesis, H1a, includes two separate 
event windows.  The first test uses days -1 and +1 and predicts an unexpected mean 
transaction size > 0.  The unexpected mean difference is positive but not significant.  A 
more detailed analysis of the individual trading days relative to the event day shows an 
unexpected negative mean difference on day -1.  This result is not predicted.   
Three possible causes of the negative unexpected mean transaction size exist.  
First, larger traders relative to small are waiting until the ED/AD to transact.  A dearth 
takes place in large trading.  Second, small traders relative to large transact more prior to 
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the event date.  An upsurge in small investor trading happens.  Third, a combination of 
the first two explanations occurs.  This last possibility would be consistent with the Lee 
(1992) findings.  He examined small and large traders’ responses to earnings 
announcements and found  “There is also some weak indication of directional 
imbalances in the preannouncement period which is positive for small traders but 
negative for large trades (Lee 1992, p 285).”  I examined the unexpected volume on 
day’s -4 to -1.24  Unexpected volume can add insight to the negative mean transaction 
size on prior to the concurrent disclosure.  Unexpected volume is not significant on any 
of these pre-event days.  A significant decrease in the unexpected volume would be 
consistent with a drop in large institutional trades during these days.  Because 
unexpected volume was not significant, 
The second event window for H1a includes day +2 to +4 and also has an 
unexpected result.   Prior literature has shown an increase in small investor trading 
relative to large investor trading several days after accounting information occurs.25  My 
results show that over the second three day event window large traders are transacting on 
the concurrent disclosures.   
 
                                                 
24   Unexpected volume was calculated in the as described in equations two and three in the Research 
Design Chapter.    
25   Sensitivity analysis was performed on each of the five testable hypothesis (H1a, H1b, H2, H4c, and 
H5b) using alternate length event windows.  I tested days -1 to +5 and -1 to +10 where applicable.  The 
results displayed in Tables 4 to 8 are qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged under any combination of 
these days.      
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Table 4. Differences in Average Actual and Expected Mean Transaction Sizes  
for Concurrent Disclosure Setting Testing the Event Day (ED) 
 
H1a:  ED / AD / FD and ED / AD – FD 
 
H1b: ED / FD  
 
Panel A: H1a for 264 Observations  
 
Days 
(Relative to  
Event Day) 
 
 
 
Ho 
 
 
 
Prediction 
Average  
Actual  
Mean Tran.  
Sizea 
Average 
Expected  
Mean Trans. 
Size 
 
Unexpected 
Mean  
Difference 
 
 
t- 
Stat. 
-1   1438.22 1522.22 -84.01** -2.14
0   1599.75 1522.23 77.52* 1.36 
+1   1592.35 1522.23 70.12* 1.39 
+2   1705.42 1522.23 183.19** 2.19 
+3   1507.19 1522.23 -15.04 -0.29
+4   1581.35 1522.24 59.11 0.84 
-1 to +1  H1a > 0 1543.44 1522.23 21.21 0.68 
+2 to +4 H1a < 0 1597.99 1522.23 75.75** 1.72 
 
Panel B: H1b for 92 Observations     
 
Days 
(Relative to  
Event Day) 
 
 
 
Ho 
 
 
 
Prediction 
Average  
Actual  
Mean Tran.  
Sizea 
Average 
Expected  
Mean Trans. 
Size 
 
Unexpected 
Mean  
Difference 
 
 
tb- 
Stat. 
-1   1504.94 1434.72 70.23 0.84 
0   1605.42 1434.59 170.83 0.89 
+1   1450.88 1434.47 16.40 0.21 
-1 to +1 H1b > 0 1520.41 1434.59 85.82 1.07 
 
*, **, *** significant at the .10, .05, and .01 respectively based on one tail tests where 
predictions are made.   
a The actual, expected, and unexpected mean transaction sizes are standardized by 
multiplying the mean transaction size in shares by ∑ 〉〈 n NSTNDDEVSTNDDEV */1/1  
the standard deviation of the error terms from equation (2). 
 
 
 
In the final test of the concurrent disclosure setting, H1b, I examine a concurrent 
disclosure that does not include an AD.  The combined ED/FD event is not significant at 
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conventional levels.  These results together suggest, except for the day -1 trading, that 
relative trading is dominated by large traders and this can only be documented where an 
AD exists.26   
Table 5 reports additional sensitivity analysis for the concurrent disclosure 
setting hypothesis H1a.  H1a contains both observations that include a combination of 
ED, AD, and FD.  Panel A examines H1a where firms’ earnings announcements (AD) 
are included in the sample, while Panel B separates the two possible event day 
combinations. 27    
When the event days ED/AD/FD are analyzed separately from ED/AD – FD, an 
odd result occurs.  Trading begins again with an unexpected negative mean transaction 
size although it is only significant for the firms that do not have a concurrent FD.  A 
significant differential trading activity is observed on day 0 when the concurrent 
disclosure includes a FD.  When the disclosure does not contain a FD this response is 
delayed until day +2.  Therefore, the only significant trading window is the Panel B days 
+2 to +4, which was not predicted.       
                                                 
26   It cannot be determined if the AD is the defining difference in the two tests or if the smaller sample 
sizes have reduced the power to recognize relative trading differences.  An alternative explanation is that 
firms with ADs are systematically different from firms without ADs.     
27   See Table 6 and H4c where the SEC filing (FD) is tested.   
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Table 5. Additional Analysis on Differences in Average Actual and Expected Mean 
Transaction Sizes for Concurrent Disclosure Setting for Hypothesis 1a Testing the Event 
Day (ED)  
 
H1a:  ED / AD / FD and ED / AD – FD 
 
Panel A: H1a for 109 Observations of ED / AD / FD  Excluding ED / AD – FD   
 
Days 
(Relative to  
Event Day) 
 
 
 
Ho 
 
 
 
Prediction 
Average  
Actual  
Mean Tran.  
Sizea 
Average 
Expected  
Mean Trans. 
Size 
 
Unexpected 
Mean  
Difference 
 
 
t- 
Stat. 
-1   1506.11 1580.31 -74.21 -1.19 
0   1760.43 1580.14 180.29** 1.80 
+1   1649.36 1579.96 89.60 1.11 
+2   1635.79 1579.78 56.01 0.72 
+3   1647.45 1579.60 67.84 0.80 
+4   1659.93 1579.42 78.51 0.57 
-1 to +1  H1a > 0 1645.36 1580.14 65.23 1.27 
+2 to +4 H1a < 0 1647.05 1579.60 67.45 1.07 
 
Panel B: H1a for 155 Observations of  ED / AD – FD Excluding ED / AD / FD 
-1   1391.20 1481.99 -90.79** -1.79 
0   1488.47 1482.12 6.35 0.10 
+1   1538.87 1482.25 56.63 0.88 
+2   1753.65 1482.38 271.27** 2.08 
+3   1410.05 1482.50 -72.45 -1.13 
+4   1528.31 1482.63 45.68 0.62 
-1 to +1  H1a > 0 1472.85 1482.12 -9.27 -0.23 
+2 to +4 H1a < 0 1564.00 1482.50 81.50* 1.35 
 
*, **, *** significant at the .10, .05, and .01 respectively based on one tail tests where 
predictions are made.   
a The actual, expected, and unexpected mean transaction sizes are standardized by multiplying 
the mean transaction size in shares by ∑ 〉〈 n NSTNDDEVSTNDDEV */1/1   the standard 
deviation of the error terms from equation (2).   
 
 
 
Event First Disclosure Setting  
Table 6 reports mean differences in actual less expected mean transaction sizes 
for the event first setting.  For the ED - FD combination, I test only the ED.  The event 
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requiring the filing of an 8-K has not been publicly disclosed through either an AD or 
FD.  Therefore, this hypothesis tests the relative use of leaked or insider information.  
Carter and Soo (1998) found information content surrounding the ED.  My results show 
no differential trading activity to the ED.         
 
 
Table 6. Differences in Average Actual and Expected Mean Transaction Sizes for  
Event First Disclosure Setting for 125 Observations Testing the Event Day (ED)  
  
 
H2:  ED – FD   
   
 
Days 
(Relative to  
Event Day) 
 
 
 
Ho 
 
 
 
Prediction
Average  
Actual  
Mean Tran. 
Sizea 
Average 
Expected  
Mean Trans. 
Size 
 
Unexpected 
Mean  
Difference 
 
 
t- 
Stat. 
-1   1520.82 1426.92 93.90 0.94 
0   1364.86 1426.60 -61.74 -1.09 
+1   1447.39 1426.28 21.11 0.26 
+2   1441.80 1431.41 10.40 0.09 
+3   1477.17 1431.00 46.16 0.41 
-1 to +3 H2 > 0 1455.81 1434.58 21.23 0.45 
 
*, **, *** significant at the .10, .05, and .01 respectively based on one tail tests where 
predictions are made.   
a The actual, expected, and unexpected mean transaction sizes are standardized by multiplying 
the mean transaction size in shares by ∑ 〉〈 n NSTNDDEVSTNDDEV */1/1   the standard 
deviation of the error terms from equation (2).       
 
 
Announcement Preceding Filing Date Disclosure Setting   
Table 7 reports mean differences in actual less expected mean transaction sizes 
for the Announcement Preceding Filing Date Disclosure Setting.  For ED/AD - FD 
combination, I test only the FD.  Differential trading activity to the last event (FD) of an 
ED/AD – FD combination is conditional on the activity to the first two combined events.  
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As shown in Table 3, the prediction for days -1 to +1 will be conditional on the H1a 
results.  In Table 5, Panel B, a positive unexpected transaction size is observed in days 
+2 to +4.   Since a differential trading activity is documented to the ED/AD, the 
subsequent FD will only produce a differential trading activity if this filing contains 
additional information.  Unexpected mean transaction size is not significant at 
conventional levels.  The results show no differential trading activity to an FD that 
occurs after an AD. 
 
 
Table 7. Differences in Average Actual and Expected Mean Transaction Sizes for 
Announcement Preceding Filing Date Disclosure Setting for 158 Observations Testing the 
Filing Day (FD)  
  
 
H4c: ED / AD – FD 
 
 
Days 
(Relative to  
Filing Day) 
 
 
 
Ho 
 
 
 
Prediction 
Average  
Actual  
Mean Tran. 
Sizea 
Average 
Expected  
Mean Trans.  
Size 
 
Unexpected 
Mean  
Difference 
 
 
t- 
Stat. 
-1   1604.42 1523.19 81.23 0.69 
0   1607.42 1523.35 84.08 0.94 
+1   1919.95 1523.50 396.45 1.54 
-1 to +1 H4c ? 1710.60 1523.35 329.45 1.64 
 
*, **, *** significant at the .10, .05, and .01 respectively based on one tail tests where 
predictions are made.   
a The actual, expected, and unexpected mean transaction sizes are standardized by multiplying 
the mean transaction size in shares by ∑ 〉〈 n NSTNDDEVSTNDDEV */1/1   the standard 
deviation of the error terms from equation (2).    
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Other Disclosure Setting   
Table 8 reports mean differences in actual less expected mean transaction sizes 
for the other disclosure setting.  Table 8 tests the FD event occurring subsequent to an 
ED.  A sample size of 110 filings results when examining the FD portion of an 8-K 
filing (ED – FD).  H5b tests show no differential trading activity during the three day 
window -1 to +1. However, I observe a weakly significant negative differential trading 
activity on day -1 consistent with the negative response from the H1a announcements 
previously discussed.    
 
 
Table 8. Differences in Average Actual and Expected Mean Transaction Sizes  
for Other Disclosure Setting for 110 Observations Testing the Filing Day (FD)  
  
 
H5b: ED – FD 
   
 
Days 
(Relative to  
Filing Day) 
 
 
 
Ho 
 
 
 
Prediction 
Average  
Actual  
Mean Tran.  
Sizea 
Average 
Expected  
Mean Trans. 
Size 
 
Unexpected 
Mean  
Difference 
 
 
t- 
Stat. 
-1   1293.18 1394.51 -101.33* -1.49 
0   1338.08 1393.88 -55.80 -0.59 
+1   1467.22 1389.76 77.46 0.69 
-1 to +1 H5b > 0 1366.92 1394.49 -27.57 -0.48 
 
*, **, *** significant at the .10, .05, and .01 respectively based on one tail tests where 
predictions are made.   
a The actual, expected, and unexpected mean transaction sizes are standardized by multiplying 
the mean transaction size in shares by ∑ 〉〈 n NSTNDDEVSTNDDEV */1/1   the standard 
deviation of the error terms from equation (2).    
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Relative Trading Response by Hypotheses by Item 
 
Each 8-K filing is classified by the type of reporting event based on eight 
different items.28  The relative use of 8-Ks by investors could be a function of what type 
of item is being filed.  For example, sophisticated investors may be able to anticipate 
auditor resignations based on an analysis of publicly available litigation risk data (Boone 
and Raman 2001).  Therefore, when an auditor change 8-K is filed by a registrant, large 
sophisticated investors may have already traded, possibly resulting in an unexpected 
mean size < 0 when small investors react. 
Table 9 reports mean differences in actual less expected mean transaction sizes 
for each hypothesis by item.  This sensitivity analysis is performed on all hypotheses 
were the sample size by item was greater than 30.  As detailed in Table 2, Panel B, the 
most frequently filed items in the sample were (1)  other important filings such as 
lawsuits, securities issuances, and credit rating changes (67%);  and filings reporting the 
acquisition or dispositions of assets (19%).  The results by item are similar to the results 
in Tables 4-8, but with two interesting observations.  First, the H1a negative mean 
transactions sizes on day -1 seem to be driven by asset-type filings.  Large institutional 
investors might be learning of acquisitions and dispositions of assets prior to their 
occurrence.  This would be consistent with the lack of volume and decrease in large 
trades prior to announcement of these transactions.   
                                                 
28   See Chapter III for additional detailed descriptions of the individual items.   
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Second, in H4c other important items are significant.  This indicates that these 
miscellaneous types of filings are important to large traders.                                  
  
 
Table 9. Differences in Average Actual and Expected  
Mean Transaction Sizes by Hypothesis by 8-K Item  
   
Days 
(Relative to  
Event Day) 
 
 
Ho 
 
 
Prediction  
 
 
8-K Itema Sample Size
 
Mean  
Difference 
 
t- 
Stat. 
-1 to +1  H1a > 0 Two 65 116.34** -1.98
+2 to +4 H1a < 0 Two 65 14.20 0.21
-1 to +1  H1a > 0 Five 176 57.40* 1.47
+2 to +4 H1a < 0 Five 176 104.42** 1.75
     
-1 to +1 H1b > 0 Five 62 95.35 0.98
     
-1 to +3 H2 > 0 Two 30 -28.25 -0.39
-1 to +3 H2 > 0 Five 76 36.52 0.59
     
-1 to +1 H4c ? Two 59 -10.50 -0.09
-1 to +1 H4c ? Five 87 292.29* 1.76
     
-1 to +1 H5b > 0 Five 61 7.47 0.09
      
 
*, **, *** significant at the .10, .05, and .01 respectively based on one tail tests where 
predictions are made.   
a  The actual, expected, and unexpected mean transaction sizes are standardized by multiplying 
the mean transaction size in shares by ∑ 〉〈 n NSTNDDEVSTNDDEV */1/1   the standard 
deviation of the error terms from equation (2).    
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CHAPTER VI 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
I examine 8-K filings from 1993 and group them into five unique disclosure 
settings.  Each single or combined ED, AD, and FD is then tested by disclosure setting 
and by type of 8-K item filed.  My findings show that the differential trading activity to 
8-K filings is different by the type of disclosure.  Differential trading activity was found 
to be more pronounced in disclosure settings that contained a public announcement.  
This finding may be important for regulators and standard setters.  Regulation FD 
requires registrants that need to communicate important information to shareholders to 
issue a press release or file an 8-K filing.  Future regulation might consider the type of 
disclosure.  In addition, the type of Form 8-K disclosure also had an effect on the 
differential trading activity. Form 8-K filings of acquisition or disposition of assets were 
the most pronounced when examining transactions around the filing of an 8-K.  Finally, 
the differential trading activity to these filings differs from other accounting events such 
as earnings announcements and annual report filings.  I find a small differential trading 
activity followed by a large differential trading activity, the opposite of other accounting 
events.  This may suggest that large investors relative to small delay trading until the 
event day and small investors may not use 8-K information to trade.   
This paper is subject to the following limitations.  First, I did not exclude the first 
trade of the day for each firm.  Opening trades can be an accumulation of multiple orders 
and it might add noise to my measures.  Second, I do not test if firms self-select into the 
type of disclosure setting.  Firms that issue or do not issue a press release or firms the 
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delay or accelerate these announcements might be systematically different from other 
firms.  One interesting issue for future research is to examine what caused the day -1 
small trader response.  Was this decrease in mean transaction size due to more small 
traders or fewer large traders?            
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